The space of possibilities of action generated by a social field (i.e., a set of norms and rules of conduct that determine the burdens of a specific social context) andĪ particular form of capital (economic, social, cultural, etc.), which establishes the amount and type of power that an agent can employ in a field. In other words, social actions are an effective product of the encounter of agents' individual dispositions with In fact, Bourdieu conceived of social actions as the result of the relation between the field and capital-that is, the objective structures independent from individual social agents and the habitus's predispositions possessed by agents themselves. Such a definition of dispositional properties seems to fit Bourdieu's account of habitus. For instance, the fact that ‘The object x is fragile’ should be analysed as ‘If x were to be struck, then x would break’. A dispositional property always implies a counterfactual conditional, both at the conceptual and empirical level. The first relevant feature is its characterization in terms of dispositional properties. The inner functioning and nature of habitus can be described according to three main characteristics. 2 BOURDIEU'S ACCOUNT OF HABITUS: DISPOSITIONS, PERCEPTIONS, EXPECTATIONS The conclusions will briefly discuss some theoretical advantages of my model of the habitus of recognition. The last part will sketch a formal interpretation of habitus as a habitus of recognition. The third section will confront the different ideas of Bourdieu and Honneth concerning the nature of ethics and its relation to the process of social reproduction, arguing that their divergences are not incommensurable. This section will also highlight the importance of the imbrication of practical attitudes, perceptive schemes, and empirical and normative expectations for the realization of good forms of recognition. In the second part, I will illustrate the important role that social recognition has in Bourdieu's account of the social reproduction and internalization of habitus. In the first part, the paper will describe the inner functioning of habitus as a system of dispositional properties ruled by schemes of perceptions and practical expectations. More precisely, I assert that habitus can embody systems of expectations and hopes that allow for the realization of intersubjective interactions, such as love, esteem, and respect. In this respect, habitus could be a promising analytical tool for considering the social factors that structure some of our basic intersubjective relations of reciprocal recognition and favour their sedimentation and embodiment. ![]() This paper will argue that beyond the original purposes pursued by Bourdieu, habitus could also be employed to deepen the analysis of disinterested relations of social recognition. In short, lacking everything that I put under the notion of ‘habitus’, Foucault cannot account for the much subtler forms of domination which come to operate through belief and the pre-reflexive agreement of the body and mind with the world (p. Talking about the limits of Michel Foucault's approach, Bourdieu (as cited in Wacquant, 1993) stated:įoucault ignores the whole process of inculcation of cognitive schemata of perception, appreciation and action, resulting from the internalization of the structures of the world and which, arising out of gentle violence, make gentle violence possible. In fact, habitus has another purpose: it allows social scientists to develop a critical approach to explaining the logic and nature of social reproduction and domination. The notion of habitus is a logical and methodological tool that can help social theorists and scientists explain how it is possible for human beings to be involved in multiple social practices at the same time without a continuous reflective activity. In this respect, on one hand, habitus should be considered a theoretical prompt suggesting that the strategies of action of social agents are not exclusively grounded in their rational and reflexive choices. ![]() If there are practical regularities that can be registered empirically, this is because there is a correspondence between the mental, perceptive, and bodily patterns of habitus (second-order objectivity) and a given set of social structures-that is, the social fields with their peculiar shape and distribution of capital (first-order objectivity). Bourdieu has always underlined that the regularities that can be registered in agents' social practices by sociologists, anthropologists, or ethnologists are not generated and governed by rules or models by which agents intentionally inspire their conduct. Through the concept of habitus, Pierre Bourdieu developed a sociological ‘theory of practice as the product of a practical sense, of a socially constituted ‘sense of the game’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp.
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